Before Knowing How To Make A Blog, These Are The Things You Need To Know First!

htmabStarting a blog but don’t know how to make a blog? This article will be all about how to make a blog. First off, you need to have the skills and interests in writing an article or articles. Why? Well, writing a blog is mostly about articles. The only difference between blogs and articles are the way they are published. Before we discuss about how blogs are made, let us tackle how they are different from each other. As mentioned, they differ on how they are published. Articles are published in newspapers or magazines. Mostly they are about show business and other famous news. As for blogs, they are published in the internet. There are virtual magazines and newspapers on the internet and they call it newsletter.

They enable you to view news in the internet from their site (the virtual newspaper company), and if you like the news that they pick then you can register your email address and they will keep you updated with the news by sending you links of the news to you and by clicking the link, you will be routed to their website where you can view that news and other news you might be interested to read.

Will Learning How To Start Your Own Blog Guarantee Earnings?

If you learned how to start your own blog without thinking or looking for at least 5 sites that are currently looking for bloggers, then you are going to have a bad time. Before you make up your mind that you want to learn how to start your own blog because it is a good sideline, you should look for sites that are hiring bloggers continuously. Having an ability or skill for blogging without a job to use your skills with is like investing for nothing. That is why you need to look for something that you can possibly apply to after you have finished your courses or tutorials about blogs.

After you have graduated from the courses and tutorials and you are sure that you are ready to put your skills to test, then you should start applying. Here is one way to apply: create your own sample. The sample can be anything about things that make sense. The sample should be at least three to five hundred words. Make sure the things you are writing make sense and they are worth reading. A way to make it worth reading is by making your article about something that is currently happening.

Make A List Of The Best Blog Ideas

Pick a topic and surf the internet for the best blog ideas you can get. Once you have a list of the best blog ideas, you can focus on one at a time. That is also true of any topic. All you have to do is have a desire to write and generate a following of your writing. You can start with the many free blog sites that allow you to write and publish freely. In fact, that is how people started becoming bloggers.

More importantly, everyone that can access the internet has a voice now. You can be for or against a topic or you can be neutral and just report events. You can be as judgmental as you want and offer your opinions freely and vigorously. You may not have a huge following if you use the best blog ideas only to criticize or be negative about them. In this huge world of ours, there is bound to be at least someone that will agree with your negativity. They will be happy to jump on your band wagon and add their voice to yours. Whether these will be seen as the best blog ideas by a new reader or just as someone’s tirade you will never know.

Get Into Snoring Remedies and Modifying Your Lifestyle

preg-sleepAs you search for snoring remedies, you should start modifying your lifestyle, too. You may find a number of snoring treatments today but your snoring will keep on coming back or it will not be fully eliminated if your way of living is not proper. You need to quit smoking and drinking too many alcoholic beverages. It is also important to keep you weight controlled. Be conscious about your fitness by means of eating the right food. Avoid foodstuff with preservatives and never indulge on junks. It’s always recommended to stick to nutritious edibles such as fruits and vegetables. Drink a lot of water because just like the beliefs of our old folks, water is a great medicine. It is also important to be involved with activities that will require you to exert physical effort. You need regular exercise to be fit and get rid of snoring. When choosing a snoring remedy, always consider the guidelines given by your doctor. Do not rely on your own knowledge or what your friends or relatives have to say about your snoring. The doctor knows better when it comes to snoring and only real professionals can help you cure it. Set an appointment with your doctor immediately after learning that you are a snorer, or just check some stop snoring information at

The Pregnant Woman and the Snorer

My husband and I have been married for a year now. It’s only recently that he started snoring and I really think he needs some snoring remedies to do away with it immediately. We went to the doctor yesterday and she confirmed that I am pregnant. As much as I wanted to keep to myself that my husband’s snoring is keeping me awake all night, there’s no way I can put up with it with this condition. I am pregnant and I need sufficient sleep. It is something that I will never fulfill with a snorer beside me at bed. I decided to discuss this matter with my husband and he understood where I am coming from. I am just worried about our baby and I want to have a healthy pregnancy. I did not have to tell him just what to do because he knows exactly what I wanted to happen. He volunteered to sleep to another room while he’s still treating his snoring. I appreciate his being an open-minded person. I know that it’s more comfortable to sleep in our room but for the sake of our baby, he’s willing to give up comfort. I just wish he gets better soon so we can sleep beside each other again.

Looking At Historical Intervention At A Good Time

lahiOh, oh, oh it’s a lovely war, begins the old verse. Ever since the Kosovo intervention started, commentators have noted that this is a liberal war. Its methods, for instance, are those pioneered by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in Vietnam-”graduated escalation” and all that. It also has a liberal aim-to protect the Kosovar Albanians from “ethnic cleansing“-that is quite untainted by any selfish U.S. or Western interest. And, finally and conclusively, its methods have completely undermined its aims, since graduated escalation has allowed Serbian forces ample time to empty Kosovo of ethnic Albanians. Q.E.D.

NATO’s intervention certainly did not have to follow this course. Since Milosevic had already sent forces against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the West might reasonably have decided that curbing his capacity to cause trouble at NATO’s backdoor was a legitimate strategic aim. Acting on that logic, it would then have recognized Kosovo as a state that had been entitled to claim its independence when the former Yugoslavia broke up but had been forcibly prevented from doing so by Serbia. That in turn would have provided a basis in international law to recruit, train, equip, and purge an effective Kosovo Liberation Army (as American mercenaries, with official U.S. backing, trained the Croatian Army) and, when the time came, to support these local ground troops with purposive NATO air support.

The likely outcome cannot be foretold with precision-as Hitler said, he who starts a war enters a dark room-but the policy would at least have had a desirable and achievable war aim: namely, a new and more stable Balkan balance of power in which a weaker and chastened Serbia is surrounded by militarily defensible states allied to NATO.

But this conservative strategic vision-though advocated by some, notably Lady Thatcher and Noel Malcolm, the historian of the Balkans- was never really considered, let alone followed. This is in part because, although the policy is moral in the traditional sense of seeking to achieve a legitimate aim by prudent and proportionate means, it nonetheless has the flavor of 19th-century realpolitik about it, rather than the windy, high-minded moralizing that liberals like Bill Clinton and Tony Blair mistake for an ethical foreign policy.

There was also, however, a specific reason of policy why the conservative strategy was rejected: Although it was opposed to Serbia’s aggressive nationalism, it was not opposed to ethnic nationalism in principle. Indeed, it would have enlisted the ethnic nationalism of Croatia and Kosovo (as well as the multiethnic patriotism of Bosnia) to check the Serbian variety.

bsAs for the underlying theoretical question of whether ethnic nationalism is a legitimate basis for statehood, the conservative strategy (like conservative political theory in general) gives no single answer. Sometimes ethnic nationalism will ameliorate popular discontent with the least upheaval-for instance, granting the Slovaks independence peacefully; sometimes it will make matters worse, as in multiethnic Bosnia disrupted by the national claims of Bosnian Serbs; and sometimes it is an irresistible force even though its first effects will be to make matters worse, as is perhaps the case with Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. The conservative theory of statehood is that circumstances alter cases.

But Bill Clinton has a much grander theory of statehood than that platitude. His vision is opposed to ethnic nationalism as the basis for statehood in principle; it favors a new international order in which ethnic groups enjoy limited cultural autonomy in large, new, multiethnic, multicultural federations like, er, the good old U.S.A.; and it sees the Kosovo war as the first battle in the realization of this benign future. Here are two excerpts from a recent speech by the Hot Springs Metternich:

(1)”If we were to choose this course [either independence or partition for Kosovo], we would see the continuous fissioning of smaller and smaller ethnically based, inviable [sic] states, creating pressures for more war, more ethnic cleansing, more of the politics of repression and revenge.”

(2) “Finally, we must remember the principle we and our allies have been fighting for in the Balkans is the principle of multiethnic, tolerant, inclusive democracy. We have been fighting against the idea that statehood must be based entirely on ethnicity.”

This is a sort of upside-down Wilsonianism. Where Wilson pushed national self-determination, Clinton pushes a liberal, multicultural empire in which ethnic groups are limited to cultural self-expression.

But there are a number of narrow and unvisionary problems with this vision. In the first place, many-perhaps most-existing states are based on ethnic nationalist foundations, including such American allies as Japan, Germany, Spain, Israel, Ireland, France, and almost all of central and eastern Europe. Are they all illegitimate? All doomed to be subsumed into new multicultural entities? And if so, are they aware of the fact-or that America’s (and NATO’s) new policy is their national euthanasia?

Second, far from fading from the scene, ethnic nationalism is advancing. The collapse of Communism liberated a host of ancient nations in Europe and Eurasia from the prisonhouse of multiculturalism that was the Soviet empire. Now, the USSR really was a polity in which ethnic nationalism was limited to cultural expression, so that, in Anthony Daniels’s mordant description, “under Communism, all minorities dance.” But the peoples concerned found that unsatisfactory. And having so recently gained their political independence, they cherish it. Clinton’s new policy is thus a victim of spectacularly bad timing.

Third, the new multiethnic, multicultural democracies that the president sees as the hope of the future do not actually exist as yet. The European Union, which he cites, has the ambition to become a multicultural federation, but as yet it is still a colloquy of national governments. And the multiethnic federations that used to exist- principally the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia-have perished, leaving behind them nations in which ethnic nationalism is all the fiercer for having been suppressed for 50 years.

These states were not, of course, democracies-but the unfortunate fact from Clinton’s standpoint is that there are no examples of successful, long-running, multiethnic, multicultural democracies. (The apparent but misleading exceptions, India and Switzerland, raise questions larger than can be dealt with in a brief article.) Democracy seems to require the kind of fellow-feeling of which nationalism, whether of an ethnic or a cultural kind, is the main modern expression.

Calling Kosovo

kcIn Kosovo today the Serbian army and paramilitary police are committing atrocities on the most terrible scale. Nothing comparable has been seen in Europe since the heyday of Hitler’s Wehrmacht and the SS. The victims are ethnic Albanians, almost all of them Muslim. They are being persecuted and killed for what they are, not for anything they have done. Their towns and villages are burning. Teachers are shot in front of their pupils. A mother had to watch while her husband, a well-known civil-rights lawyer, and her two sons were taken from the house to be murdered. Hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians have fled for their lives. And we do not yet know anything like the full extent of the horror.

Equally depressing, Serbs are demonstrating in many cities of the world, from Paris and Moscow all the way to Melbourne, to express approval of what is being done in their name. The man almost solely responsible is Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, and Serbs now seem to support him unanimously, without reservation. They do not notice their victims. Inverting and even insulting reality, they transfer the guilt for these Serbian genocidal deeds to the very NATO alliance that is trying to prevent them. They are daubing swastikas on portraits of President Clinton and on the walls of American embassies. Nationalistic fantasies have overcome their reason, just as similar fantasies once swayed German crowds to applaud Hitler during a career that could only end in destroying them too.

The former Yugoslavia, now a lost country, was a hodgepodge of peoples living somewhat claustrophobically side by side. Received opinion has it that they had loved to hate one another down the centuries. In fact, the usual modern ideologies had broken up what used to be a settled existence, converting individuals into masses. After the war, Marshal Tito had imposed Communism on Yugoslavia. According to its doctrine, the ideological identity of Communism was so supreme that nationality and ethnicity were secondary, at the level of folklore. Holding all the constituent peoples down, the secret police could not hold them together. Communism was a fantasy too, and there was a price to be paid when the country was at last rid of it.

Big Brother, the Soviet Union, offers a comparison. Its constituent peoples are far more numerous, and they are also seeking a path to their various identities. Civil war is open or latent in many areas of the old Soviet Union. The Chechens put the post-Soviet Russian Federation on the spot with the demand for a nation- state of their own. President Yeltsin had the response of the career Communist that he is and sent in the tanks. Sixty thousand people were killed, hundreds of thousands fled; Chechnya is now wrecked and its political status uncertain, still up for grabs.

Things did not have to turn out so cruelly. In the former Czechoslovakia, President Vaclav Havel set the opposite example. A dissident and a democrat by conviction, he did not want the union between Czechs and Slovaks to be dissolved. The Slovaks insisted, though, and he ceded with sorrow, not anger. It is possible, then, to throw off the Communist fantasy peacefully. If Czechs and Slovaks see fit, they can reunite one day.

bhYugoslavia began the meltdown into its constituent peoples in 1989. Milosevic could have chosen to follow the example either of Yeltsin or of Havel. Tito’s heir, and ultimately Lenin’s too, he was another career Communist, with a temperament that considers compromise and power-sharing to be evidence of weakness. Aiming for supremacy and central control, to be exercised exclusively by Serbs, he therefore attacked the neighboring peoples at all points of the compass. Slovenes and Croats were able to defend themselves and gain independence. Gypsies and the Hungarian minority have fled. The future of Macedonia and Montenegro is in the balance. After suffering a specially vicious onslaught, Bosnia is now a sort of U.N. protectorate. Kosovo may become another sort of NATO protectorate.

The one certain achievement of Milosevic’s continuous violence is the extinction of all possibility of putting together a federation to replace Communist Yugoslavia. “Ethnically cleansed,” the Serbia that he has created will not be worth having. As with Hitler’s racially pure state of Germany, the hatred and fear that it has aroused contain the elements of its eventual destruction.

The West also faced a choice. It would have been possible, even easy, to assert that whatever goes on in another country is nobody else’s business. Benighted foreigners, it can be maintained, go in for such things as ethnic cleansing, and fellow feeling for the victims is mere sentimentality. Besides, intervention was always likely to be ineffective, a moral gesture at best, counterproductive at worst. Ground troops alone could protect the Kosovar Albanians, and they are not available. Long-range bombing would (and did) give Milosevic the opportunity first to throw out the Western monitors already in place and then to fall on the Kosovar Albanians with full savagery while nobody was watching.

Over the past two years or so, Western leaders proved unable to make up their minds. Was this an issue for the U.N. or for NATO? Could Ambassador Holbrooke whisper something enticing in Milosevic’s ear? Surely the man was unwilling to go to the extreme lengths of defying them all, and so if the first ultimatum did not work, then the second would, or perhaps the third. This delay called into question the principle of intervention and has contributed to the messy improvisations of current strategy.

At the core of this issue is globalization, which has already internationalized what had been national or regional disputes. To what extent is government across the world to be based on consent or on force? Are the values of democracy universal or not? And if so, are they to be imposed or is that too extreme a paradox?

Russia and China are the two main countries criticizing NATO at present. Both face the prospect of Kosovo-type breakaways in their own populations, and they have made clear that in that event they will resort to force. Intervention by NATO against Milosevic offers a precedent that to Russia and China looks like a challenge to switch to government by consent.

The Arab world might have been expected to applaud the rescue of fellow Muslims. Its silence is particularly eloquent. Force rules there. And at the moment when Milosevic was embarking on his long campaign of murder, so was Saddam Hussein. The parallels are close.

The outcome of the NATO campaign may well be unsatisfactory. The material damage is large. Kosovo may be partitioned, the refugees may become embittered exiles. But whether through the United Nations or NATO, the West is slowly, and somewhat incoherently, evolving supranational instruments to oppose the Saddams and Milosevics who would rule by force. If the human race has unusual good fortune, government by consent may be its general lot one day. But when words cannot argue for the rule of law, then bombs must.

Eisenhower In The House!

eithPrinciple or popularity? It’s a choice political movements always face sooner or later. And it’s a choice conservatives are having to make now, as the 2000 presidential race begins. The glittering national ratings of Texas governor George W. Bush have led many conservatives to endorse him; but other conservatives are opting for candidates to whom they are closer philosophically.

It’s a tough decision-and one that conservatives have had to make before. In 1952, the contest for the GOP nomination was essentially between Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Sen. Robert A. Taft-between eastern liberals and midwestern conservatives, between “modern” Republicans and “regular” ones, between pragmatists eager to win and idealists for whom principle was as important as victory. In the short term, the idealists lost. But by sticking to principle, they managed to advance their cause in the long run.

On Sunday evening, July 6, 1952, the day before the Republican convention opened, Sen. Taft conducted a news conference at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago. He held high a large bundle of telegrams-530 of them-from delegates pledged to him until hell froze over. “It was perhaps the most impressive display of political strength made by any political leader in American history,” wrote Richard Rovere, a liberal journalist. Rovere was not the only one to note the strong emotions that Taft aroused among his delegates, who saw in the Ohio senator not just a candidate but a political savior. Herbert Hoover, the only living Republican ex-president, endorsed Taft warmly, saying, “This convention meets not only to nominate a candidate but to save America.” Every Taft delegate believed that in his heart.

Taft seemed certain to win the 604 delegates needed for the nomination. His organization had apparently secured every possible political base, from the platform committee and credentials committee to the convention chairman. But the Eisenhower forces found a chink by challenging accredited delegates from the South, especially in Texas. Two Texas delegations had come to Chicago, one pledged largely to Taft, the other to Eisenhower, with each claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the Lone Star State.

The Eisenhower people denounced what they called “the Texas steal”; in a bit of street theater, masked “bandits” with guns carried placards that read “Taft Steals Votes” while other signs proclaimed that “RAT” stood for “Robert A. Taft.” A furious Taft replied that he had never stolen anything in his life and that the delegates had been chosen according to accepted Republican-party procedures of more than 80 years’ standing.

Taft was right: The stealing charge was, to use one of Ike’s favorite words, tommyrot. But the Eisenhower managers used the GOP’s lust for victory and the general’s five-star aura to successfully challenge slates in Georgia and Louisiana as well as in Texas. The convention delegates wanted to nominate Taft, but they had also seen polls indicating that Ike would beat any Democrat by a wide margin. Gallup had Eisenhower defeating Gov. Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, the likely Democratic nominee, by 59 to 31 percent. In a similar test between Taft and Stevenson, the latter held a 45-to-44 advantage. Republicans loved Taft, observed one commentator, but they loved victory more.

eith1On the first ballot, the count stood at Eisenhower 595, Taft 500 (30 delegates having apparently noted an early frost in the nether regions), Earl Warren 81, Harold Stassen 20, and another general, Douglas A. MacArthur, 10. There was no second ballot as Minnesota asked to be recognized and changed its vote from Stassen to Eisenhower. Sen. John Bricker, for Taft, and Sen. William Knowland, for Warren, moved that the nomination be made unanimous.

There were plenty of recriminations in Taft’s camp. He had been overconfident about the New Hampshire primary, which he lost to Eisenhower. He had not appreciated the significance of the Texas challenge. Taft also carried the burden of being seen as a regional candidate, who lacked substantial support in the populous Pacific coast, let alone the eastern states that still ruled the Republican party. The easterners, led by Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, regarded Taft as an isolationist, a Jeffersonian reactionary, and a probable loser. They wanted to win and believed they would win with the war hero Eisenhower, a strong internationalist who was sympathetic to “modern” Republicanism, with its commitment to efficiently managed government.

Most important, there was no conservative movement that Taft could call on in a time of crisis. In fact, wrote Frank Hanighen in Human Events, the “capitalists” who should have been supporting Taft’s ideas were “either stupidly donating money to foundations which oppose his ideas or complacently waiting for his triumph at the polls.” Some things never change.

So what was Taft to do now that the party he had so loyally and effectively served had spurned him? His supporters were crying and cursing and threatening to walk out. Ike, reversing the usual practice, visited Taft in his Chicago headquarters. After Eisenhower declared that Taft’s cooperation in the forthcoming campaign was “absolutely necessary,” the senator graciously responded that he would do “everything possible in the campaign to secure [the general's] election and to help in his administration.”

Still, Taft was flooded with letters from resentful supporters who vowed to work to defeat Eisenhower. Recognizing that a divided party spelled defeat, anxious Eisenhower aides proposed a summit meeting between the two Republican leaders. Taft agreed if Eisenhower would give “certain assurances” in advance: There would be no discrimination against Taft people during or after the campaign; no censorship of Taft’s proposals; a firm defense of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act; a “reasonably conservative farm policy”; and a sharp attack on President Truman’s foreign policy as developed at “Yalta, Tehran, Potsdam, and Manchuria.” In return, Taft promised to campaign “vigorously” for the ticket.

Following a two-hour breakfast meeting in New York City’s Morningside Heights in early September, a smiling Taft informed the press that the fundamental issue of the campaign, as accepted by Ike, was “liberty against the creeping socialism in every domestic field.” That fall, Ike campaigned more like Taft than Dewey. He echoed the 1952 party platform, drafted by Taft Republicans, which promised to clean up the State Department, fire the “hordes of loafers and incompetents” on the federal payroll, balance the budget, and provide a “general tax reduction.”

Sometimes, Ike even sounded like Sen. Joe McCarthy, charging, for example, that a national tolerance of Communism had “poisoned two whole decades of our national life” and insinuated itself into America’s schools, public forums, news channels, labor unions, “and-most terrifyingly-into our government itself.”

Eisenhower swept the electoral college, 442 to 89, and helped Republicans gain narrow majorities in both houses of Congress. This impressive performance owed a lot, as his supporters had always insisted, to Eisenhower’s extraordinary personal appeal. Demographic shifts, meanwhile, were breaking up FDR’s coalition. The suburbs were growing, and growing Republican.

But it was thanks to Bob Taft that the Republican party was united. Many Catholic Democrats, especially those of Irish and Polish background, voted Republican because of “Korea, Communism, and Corruption.” Ike carried four southern states because he had been forced to the right. Taft may have lost the nomination, but he won the election by insisting that the party and its presidential candidate wage an uncompromisingly conservative, anti-Communist campaign.

And the Eisenhower administration, working with Taft, started out reasonably conservative. Tragically, however, the partnership was not to last: Within six months Taft was dead. Without the anchor he provided, the Republicans drifted left-creating, for instance, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare- and lost their congressional majorities in the next elections.

So, now that Republicans have finally taken Congress back, what can Taft’s heirs do to ensure that their party does not again squander its opportunity by drifting leftward? His example provides clear lessons. Conservatives should set aside petty differences and unite as soon as possible behind a single presidential candidate. But they should also pledge to back the nominee, whoever he or she turns out to be, provided that moderate and liberal Republicans make the same pledge. And they should make certain, no matter the nominee, that the 2000 platform is a conservative one.

Above all, conservatives should act like conservatives, with no ifs, ands, buts, or hyphens. They should cling to certain fundamental principles-limited government, free enterprise, individual freedom and responsibility, traditional American values, a strong national defense-no matter how the polling winds blow and the heathen rage. For as Robert Taft demonstrated in 1952, integrity in victory and defeat is the sure foundation of a grand party-and country.

Reagan And California

racOnly yesterday, or so it seems, California was Reagan Country, and the dependable western anchor of the Republican party’s successful Sun Belt strategy. Until 1992, every GOP presidential nominee in the second half of the century carried California except for Barry Goldwater in the Lyndon Johnson landslide of 1964. When Gray Davis routed Dan Lungren in 1998, he became only the fourth Democrat this century to win the California governorship.

That was then and this is now. In 1992, Bill Clinton defeated President George Bush by a plurality, with an assist from Ross Perot. In 1996, Clinton won a majority on his own. Then in 1998, with two-term Republican governor Pete Wilson ineligible to succeed himself, the bottom dropped out for the GOP. State attorney general Lungren, a conservative who had been expected to mount a strong campaign, lost by 20 percentage points. State treasurer Matt Fong blew a mid- campaign lead in the U.S. Senate race and lost by 10 points to Barbara Boxer, the supposedly vulnerable liberal Democratic incumbent. The Republicans also suffered disastrous state-legislative losses with potential national consequences. After the 2000 census, a Democratic-controlled legislature is likely to pass a redistricting bill that could cost the GOP several House seats and perhaps even control of that chamber.

What happened? How did California become Clinton Country? And how did Lungren, whom National Review dubbed “the great right hope,” suffer such a one-sided loss? Defeat in California is a disputatious orphan. Here are the favorite theories and alibis:

Republican moderates, among others, blame conservatives for emphasizing social issues in a state that resists government curbs on abortion, marijuana, and pornography. “California has a strong libertarian streak,” observes Rep. David Dreier, an influential conservative. Lungren, who in the House had sponsored the Human Life Amendment, lost among pro-choice independents, and women. Afterward, his campaign manager Dave Puglia declared that it is impossible for a pro-life candidate to win a statewide election.

Conservatives insist that moderates, especially Wilson, bear a chunk of the blame. They claim that activist social conservatives were shunned during the Wilson years, a point that would have greater force had these conservatives turned out for Lungren. Wilson also enhanced what libertarian conservative Ron Unz calls the “toxic effect” of Proposition 187, an initiative approved by voters in 1994 but since blocked by the courts. The measure would have denied educational and most medical benefits only to illegal immigrants, but the somewhat derisive tone of Wilson’s campaign in its behalf suggested to legal immigrants an attack on them as well. Lungren paid the price in 1998, winning only a fifth of Latino voters and about a fourth of Asians.

Some political analysts say that Democrats simply have run better campaigns. That was certainly true in 1992, when Bush seemed unaware of the distress of middle-class Californians after the collapse of the aerospace industry at the end of the Cold War. It was true again in 1996, when Bob Dole failed to connect with voters. Lungren’s 1998 campaign was even more inept. He wasted time and resources in a futile attempt to link Davis to former governor Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown, whom Davis had served as chief of staff. The result was described at campaign’s end by Bill Carrick, a savvy Democratic consultant: “A Los Angeles Times poll showed that more people approved of Jerry Brown than Lungren. Others vaguely associate him with Jerry’s Deli or Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream, and in Oakland, where he’s mayor, they like him.”

It is worth noting that Brown won, in a liberal city, by promising to improve police protection and school performance and bring new business to Oakland. With few exceptions, California Democrats in the 1990s have followed Clinton’s lead in using centrist slogans and symbols to expropriate popular positions of their adversaries. Davis stressed support for the death penalty and California’s three-strikes law and the need to reform the state’s dismal educational system- traditional Republican themes. Davis also did what Clinton (and Lungren) could not do-cite his service in the Vietnam War, where he served as an Army captain and won a Bronze Star. “Davis is Clinton without the scandals,” said state senator Jim Brulte, a cerebral Republican who contends that the Democratic approach shows that conservatives have won the war of ideas.

rac1Finally, some demographers argue that the tide of history is running against Republicans no matter what they do. Republican analyst Tony Quinn notes that the recession of the early 1990s prompted Republicans and Reagan Democrats to move in droves from California to other western states, which became more conservative while California was becoming more liberal. Demographic determinists also point to an increase of minority voters, particularly Latinos, who were 8 percent of the electorate in 1994 and 14 percent in 1998. They are projected to be a third of voters by 2010. If Latinos and Asians vote on their 1998 pattern, observed Los Angeles Times columnist George Skelton, “it doesn’t take much imagination to envision California going the way of Hawaii-dominated perpetually by Democrats.”

All these analyses have something to recommend them, and they are not mutually exclusive. Puglia’s view that pro-life candidates cannot win in California may be overwrought, but they undoubtedly face an uphill fight. And Wilson’s campaign for Proposition 187, and to some degree the initiative itself, unquestionably alienated Latinos. There is also no doubt that California Democrats have run better campaigns than their GOP counterparts, with the exceptions of Wilson’s two campaigns for governor.

Should Republicans concede the state to the Democrats in 2000? This won’t happen and shouldn’t. Demographics and Democrats deserve their due, but all is not lost for Republicans in California. Before examining the potential for a GOP comeback, let us take a closer look at “Reagan Country,” in which the salient features of the political landscape were different than they seem in memory.

Ronald Reagan came along when middle-class Americans felt stifled by the Great Society, angered at campus disturbances and ghetto riots and worried about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Reagan had the advantage of being a political outsider. The party he sought to inspire and lead had been divided by the bitter 1964 California primary in which Barry Goldwater clinched the GOP nomination by narrowly defeating Nelson Rockefeller. Goldwater was subsequently demonized and defeated, while Reagan became a national political figure with a stirring televised speech in the nominee’s behalf on October 27, 1964. Johnson carried California by a million votes, and Reagan was given little chance of winning the governorship in 1966. Strategists for incumbent governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown were so convinced that Reagan was their salvation that they smeared his primary opponent, former San Francisco mayor George Christopher, to help Reagan win the primary. Christopher, meanwhile, attacked Reagan as a “Goldwater Republican” and sure loser.

Be careful what you wish for, as the old saying has it. Reagan took as his mantra the Eleventh Commandment of Gaylor Parkinson, the state GOP chairman of the day: “Thou shalt not speak ill of any fellow Republican.” He won the primary, then sought and obtained the endorsement of Christopher and other moderates. Reagan’s foes alternately portrayed him as an extremist and an unqualified actor who had been upstaged by a chimpanzee in Bedtime for Bonzo. The first attack failed because it was inaccurate and the second because it was irrelevant. (Reagan told me years later that he had indeed been upstaged by Bonzo, as humans tend to be by animals.) Reagan was proud to be an actor. After winning in a landslide, he was asked what kind of governor he would be: “I don’t know. I’ve never played a governor.”

The role suited Reagan, although it took many rehearsals. During his first year in office he agreed to a larger-than-necessary tax increase. Subsequently Reagan tried with some success to curb the growth of government. He was a practical dreamer who chipped away at the status quo. Reagan’s conservatism was tempered by the political reality of having a Republican majority in both houses of the legislature in only one of his eight years as governor. But Democrats respected him politically because he could mobilize public opinion and personally because he rarely took himself too seriously and always kept his word. In his second term, Reagan negotiated an artful compromise with Democrats that raised the grants of the neediest welfare recipients while cracking down on welfare fraud. He set aside more parklands than any other governor in California history and stopped the Army Corps of Engineers from building a high dam that would have flooded magnificent Round Valley on the state’s northern coast. He signed an abortion-rights bill that was backed by a majority of Republican legislators, including an assemblyman named George Deukmejian who would be elected to the first of two terms as governor two years after Reagan became president.

Reagan and Deukmejian were the only leaders that the land of memory called Reagan Country ever knew. Politically, they were invincible. Each won ten elections for various offices, if Reagan’s four presidential-primary victories are included. It is because of their success-and, to be fair, the success of Pete Wilson-that California acquired an inflated reputation as a Republican bastion. In reality the state has been in near-balance for four decades, with a slight edge to the Democrats except in those elections when Republicans have fielded superior candidates. After Reagan, Jerry Brown won back-to-back victories in gubernatorial races against GOP moderates. Wilson, who upset Brown in a 1982 Senate race and won reelection, is the only Republican elected to the U.S. Senate from California since 1976. Republicans have controlled both houses of the state legislature only once in 40 years and usually not either house. Reagan Country came into existence because of Reagan. It vanished into the mists when Deukmejian left office in 1991.

Today, as Republicans again seek a unifying leader, it is often said that a conservative cannot carry California. If so, that’s good news for Democrats. Conservatives firmly control the California GOP, as they demonstrated at a recent state convention where a moderate challenge to the leadership was soundly rejected. The “rock star” of the convention, as the Los Angeles Times put it, was Rep. James Rogan, fresh from the impeachment wars. He is in trouble in his San Gabriel Valley district, less because of impeachment than because of demographic changes. Rogan is being urged to run for the Senate in 2000 against the formidable Dianne Feinstein; the GOP nomination is probably his for the asking if he does.

The Senate race aside, the question remains whether the GOP presidential nominee can carry California in 2000. It is an important question, for it is difficult to see how the Republicans can regain the White House if they lose California. Steve Merksamer, who ran Deukmejian’s gubernatorial campaigns and was his chief of staff, disputes the conventional notion that a conservative cannot carry the state. But he believes that only a conservative who displays the “tolerance and inclusion” and the “generous nature” of Reagan and Deukmejian can indeed win.

There were several occasions where Reagan and Deukmejian departed from conservative orthodoxy on matters of conscience. Homosexual behavior was a highly charged issue in California in the Reagan years. Early in his governorship, Reagan’s administration was rocked by an overblown “homosexual scandal” involving key aides. Later, Reagan introduced conjugal visits into California’s prisons after being told they would reduce homosexual assaults. In 1978, a fringe conservative named John Briggs qualified a ballot initiative to bar homosexuals from teaching in public schools. Reagan, out of office and gearing up for his 1980 presidential run, was advised to say that the issue was a matter for voters to decide, a dodge used by many Republicans that year. But Reagan believed that teachers, like everyone else, should be judged on the basis of their conduct rather than their lifestyle. He opposed the Briggs initiative, assuring its defeat.

Deukmejian, who had been raised on stories of the Armenian genocide and was deeply offended by apartheid, decided in 1986 to divest California’s investments in South Africa. He signed a bill by liberal Maxine Waters, then a state legislator, to accomplish this purpose. In 1989, after a massacre of children at a Stockton school, Deukmejian signed another Democratic bill intended to ban assault weapons.

George W. arrives

California conservatives yearn for another Reagan or Deukmejian. After the calamity of the 1998 election, they searched beyond the state’s borders and found George W. Bush, the Texas governor who calls himself a “compassionate conservative.” Whether Bush is a long-distance runner remains to be seen, but he meets the “tolerant and inclusionary” test. He is also personable, in the manner of Reagan, a quality that often matters in California. In January, a majority of Republican state legislators urged Bush to run. In March, he was endorsed by 19 of the state’s 24 GOP House members. Two aspects of the Bush groundswell are notable: its breadth and the high degree of enthusiasm by conservative officeholders. House supporters range from John Doolittle on the right to Steve Horn, a true moderate. Dreier heads the California House members committed to Bush. Another Bush backer is assemblyman Bruce Thompson, who has strong ties to the Christian Right and is California’s most conservative legislator.

There is no mystery about the reason for the Bush boom. “Losing is a great unifier,” says Brulte, “and Republicans of every description lost in 1998.” Dreier says that California Republicans have a “thirst to win” and that Bush is the likeliest winner. Merksamer, who has not endorsed anyone, says Californians prefer westerners and that Bush projects a “western image like Goldwater and Reagan did.” Quinn notes that Davis carried 15 legislative districts now represented by Republicans, some of whom will be forced out by the state’s term- limits law in 2000. Without a strong presidential candidate, several of these districts could be lost.

Bush appeals to endangered Republicans because he is a proven winner in a populous and diverse state with many similar characteristics to California, including a high-tech industry, an export-based economy, and significant numbers of Hispanics (called Latinos in California). The latter point is crucial, because Bush received roughly half of the Hispanic vote in Texas when he was reelected last year. Reagan and Deukmejian obtained 40 percent or more of a much smaller Latino vote, as well as a majority of Asians. A repeat of Lungren’s showing among Latinos in 2000 would translate into a million-vote margin for Democrats in California, too much to overcome in other constituencies.

Solving the Latino equation will not be easy for the GOP in California even if Bush is the nominee. As Unz observes, alienation from the GOP runs deep among immigrants, abetted by changes in federal law that make it easier to deport legal immigrants for minor and long-ago offenses. But Democrats may suffer a backlash if they overdraw the portrait of the GOP as “nativist” and anti-Latino, particularly since Wilson has decided not to run for president. A. G. Block, editor of the nonpartisan California Journal, says, “With Wilson out of the picture, Democrats could go too far with this. My sense is that people are tired of the issue.”

Politics is a contest between people as well as policies, and Bush presently has an advantage over Gore. A recent survey commissioned by GOP consultant Joe Shumate gave Bush a 51-43 lead over Gore in California. Significantly, Bush led across the Republican spectrum and also among independents. The latter point could be crucial. Politics has changed since Reagan’s day, and the “kids of Reagan Democrats,” as Shumate calls them, are now apt to be registered as “decline to state,” the California equivalent of independent, or in a minor party.

Will Reform Actually Reform??

wrarObservers say UA opponents and supporters are both talking about local mergers because both sides suspect the idea of a national UA party is losing support. Moreover, evidence exists to show the local merger concept may have always been more acceptable to the party’s grassroots. In votes taken at the UA’s Ottawa convention in February, the local merger option finished second to the idea of forming a new national party. But prior to that, 80 Reform riding associations, including 50 in Ontario, had formally elected to approach other local parties in an effort to end vote splitting.

According to Calgary Reform MP Jason Kenney, Reformers must vote yes in the referendum for the local merger option to proceed. “Some people have taken a schizophrenic view about this,” Mr. Kenney says. “They aren’t in favour of continuing the UA process, but they support local riding initiatives. But Reform policy insists the UA

Who gains, who doesn’t


Liberals     46%         46%
Reform       16%         26%
PCs          12%         26%
NDP          13%         14%

Liberals would hold 93% of their vote and lose 6% to UA.

Reform would see 87% of their vote go to UA, 6% go to the Liberals and lose
10% to the NDP.

NDP would hold 84% of their vote, 4% would go to the Liberals and 3% to the
Bloc Quebecois.

SOURCE: Pollara

process be followed, even to create local mergers.”

The strain over Reform’s future has led to name-calling by both sides. Last week Mr. Morrison characterized the UA as a product of Ottawa elitists out of touch with the party’s grassroots. In return, Maurice Murphy, president of Reform’s Ottawa West-Nepean constituency association, said UA opponents were “isolationists” whose unfounded fears were based on conjecture.

Despite the bickering, the UA continued gathering endorsements from outside Reform. Conservative Dick Barr, chairman of the Ontario-based Blue Committee, which during last year’s Tory leadership campaign openly sought a candidate willing to work with Reform, announced last week that his Mississauga-South riding association is prepared to share a candidate with Reform in order to topple Liberal incumbent Paul Szabo. Vote-splitting in Ontario has handed the Liberals “two undeserved majorities” in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections, said Mr. Barr, who finished a distant second to Mr. Szabo in 1997. Even Tory leader Joe Clark, while continuing to spurn a formal right-wing coalition, has recently allowed for the possibility of joint candidates in “six or seven” ridings.

That will not be nearly enough to prevent the Liberal’s “101 Dalmatians” from being re-elected in Ontario, says independent Toronto MP John Nunziata. Three weeks ago Mr. Nunziata met with Tory Jim Jones, the only other non-Liberal MP elected in Ontario, to discuss the UA. “Most people vote for a national party, not a local candidate,” says Mr. Nunziata. “Without a national alternative to the Liberals, we might as well hand over the keys to 24 Sussex Drive to [current finance minister and putative Liberal leadership candidate] Paul Martin.”

Such a prospect is unacceptable to Paul Arnold, a Victoria organizer for the pro-UA advocacy group called GREAT (Grassroots Reformers Endorse Alternative Team). Reform’s volunteers have worked too hard to endure another four years of Liberal governance, he says. “People are fatigued. I don’t think we can sit back and let the Liberals win another majority government without losing people in this party who have worked hard for so long.”

tguardMr. Arnold formed GREAT to counteract the efforts of Grassroots United Against Reform’s Demise (GUARD), which opposes the UA. Last week GUARD released a voting analysis suggesting that in the 1997 federal election, even if 60% of the Conservative votes had gone to Reform, the UA as currently envisioned would still have captured no more than 73 to 92 seats, leaving plenty of room for the Liberals to form a majority government. Nor has the situation changed since 1997. A December survey by Pollara, the Grits’ main polling organization, showed only 26% of Canadian voters supporting the UA, well behind the Liberals at 46%.

Such a dismal showing destroys arguments for a merger on a national scale, says GUARD organizer and Edmontonarea farmer Bruce Stubbs. He, too, rejects the local merger concept, which he says was resurrected by Reform elite when opposition to the UA spread through the grassroots. “It’s a red herring,” he says, “something they’ve offered to keep the process alive.” Like Mr. Kenney, Mr. Stubbs points out that local ridings are currently forbidden by Reform’s constitution from cutting deals with their Tory counterparts.

GUARD’s voting analysis does not bother Reform strategist Anderson. “What’s wrong with starting off with 92 seats after the 1997 election?” he asks. Nor is he is concerned over mid-term polls. “The polls showed John Turner beating Brian Mulroney,” he says, “and who won in 1984 and 1988?”

GREAT’s Arnold compares the UA debate to the party’s 1991 conference in Saskatoon, which voted to allow Reform to expand east of the Manitoba border. “There was a lot of opposition from a noisy minority,” he says, “but in the end, expansion was supported by 92% of the party. The UA is the final step in that process.”

University of Calgary political scientist Tom Flanagan, who once served as the Reform Party’s policy director, is not so sure. “I think this is different than the Saskatoon conference,” he says. “There, things seemed clearer. But people are genuinely puzzled over the UA. I don’t even know how I’ll vote.”

Subscribe to RSS feed